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1994-05-02
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<text>
<title>
The Shift in Palestinian Thinking
</title>
<article>
<hdr>
Current History, January 1992
The Shift in Palestinian Thinking
</hdr>
<body>
<p>By Muhammad Muslih--teaches political science at C.W. Post
College, Long Island University.
</p>
<p> Another 1948 is in the making for the Palestinians. With the
end of the Persian Gulf war, only 70,000 of the 400,000
Palestinians who lived in Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion in
August 1990 remain, facing an uncertain future. The 250,000 who
fled to Jordan during the Gulf crisis now live in a state of
homelessness, joblessness, and despair. Palestinian financial
losses since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis are estimated at
$10 billion; this figure excludes the loss of Palestinian assets
in Kuwait and the costs the war imposed on the Palestinian
economy in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.
</p>
<p> Key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have
basically reversed the 1974 Rabat summit resolution, which
recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The
Palestine question, once at the top of the Arab agenda--at
least rhetorically--has been deferred, though not abandoned.
Why?
</p>
<p> The answer lies in the way PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and
senior PLO officials guided the ship of Palestinian politics
during the Gulf crisis. Throughout the crisis several Arafats
were in evidence. There was the democratic Arafat, who had to
take the wishes of his constituency into consideration; the
single-minded Arafat, who dismissed the better judgement of his
most senior colleagues; and the overconfident Arafat, who
mistakenly believed that with his limited resources he could act
as a mediator between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and
Saddam's Arab enemies. Above all, there was the Arafat who was
perceived as the "legitimizer" of Saddam's invasion and
occupation of Kuwait.
</p>
<p> Which aspect of Arafat's behavior best conformed to reality?
Certainly, there was overwhelming support for Saddam among the
Palestinians living in Jordan and the occupied territories, not
because he invaded Kuwait, but because he stood up to the United
States, Israel's protector and supporter. As far as the
Palestinians were concerned, the fact that United States
President George Bush mobilized the world to reverse Iraq's
seizure of Kuwait but had done nothing to force Israel to comply
with United Nations (UN) resolutions concerning the occupied
territories was the epitome of selective morality. Moreover,
Saddam misled the Palestinians into believing that Iraq had a
deterrent against nuclear Israel, thus preparing the ground to
end Israel's occupation. As Palestinian journalist Hanna Siniora
explained the Palestinians' positive reaction to Saddam, "When
a drowning man sees land disappear slowly in front of him, and
suddenly a man throws him a rope, he will not ask who that man
is."
</p>
<p> The Palestinians were drowning before the Gulf crisis. The
end of the cold war signaled the further strengthening of
Israeli hegemony. The prospect of a "Greater" Israel--that
is, one that included the territory now under Israeli control
in the West Bank--was becoming more of a reality, thanks
primarily to the influx of over 200,000 Soviet Jews. Moreover,
"transfer" policy, which many Israeli right-wingers interpret
as the expulsion of the Palestinians from the territories, was
a topic of public discussion; peace-for-peace rather than the
land-for-peace formula became the official policy of the
Israeli government; settlement activity in the occupied
territories was escalating in leaps and bounds; and dialogue
between the United States and the PLO was frozen. All this took
place against a backdrop of Arab acquiescence and inaction.
</p>
<p> This explains, but does not necessarily justify, the
pro-Saddam reaction of the Palestinians in the occupied
territories and in Jordan. Arafat, who was by then more mindful
of the preferences of his West Bank and Gaza constituency then
he had been five or ten years earlier, rode the popular tide in
the territories and took a pro-Iraq stance.
</p>
<p>Disagreement with Arafat
</p>
<p> Another aspect of Arafat's behavior was that he
uncharacteristically dismissed not only the advice of some of
his closest aides, but also the desires of the Palestinians in
Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf. These included Salah Khalaf,
the number two man in the PLO (who was assassinated at the
start of the Gulf war), and many Palestinian intellectuals who
wanted the PLO to distance itself from Saddam. When it did not,
they strongly opposed Arafat's handling of the crisis. Many
Palestinians living in Kuwait and the Gulf, especially those
with business interests or government positions, were also
critical of Arafat. Activists from the mainstream Fatah faction
of the PLO in Kuwait did not simply condemn the Iraqi invasion;
some of them even joined the Kuwaiti underground.
</p>
<p> Those who disagreed with Arafat argued that the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait was a violation of the principles from which
the Palestinian cause drew its legitimacy and moral strength.
They also noted that the Palestinians, vulnerable as they were,
should avoid taking sides in inter-Arab conflicts and that
Kuwait had always supported the Palestinians and had opened its
borders to skilled and unskilled Palestinian labor. Finally,
even the appearance of a mild tilt toward Iraq would dry up
Gulf financial support for the Palestinians, thus eroding the
Palestinian economic base.
</p>
<p> Why did Arafat choose to ignore these points? Some say the
reason was Saddam's seduction of Arafat at least two years
before the crisis with facilities, logistics, and the
unrealistic promise of deterring Israel. Others mention the
emergence of a more militant and uncompromising Israel.
</p>
<p> But there is an additional reason. The PLO, which emerged and
operates in exile, has traditionally articulated the political
desires of the Palestinians in the diaspora. With the onset of
the intifada (uprising) in the occupied territories in December
1987, the balance started to shift to the Palestinians in the
West Bank and Gaza. While the Palestinians have always viewed
themselves as an indivisible political community, the intifada
forced the PLO leadership in Tunis to pay closer attention to
the views of the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.
The overriding concern of these Palestinians is to end the
occupation, even if it entails recognition of Israel.
</p>
<p> With his view fixed on the Palestinians in the occupied
territories and in Jordan, Arafat thus distanced himself from
the largely anti-Saddam position of the Palestinians living in
the Gulf states. He instead adopted an ambivalent attitude:
support for Iraq as the challenger of foreign forces, as well as
opposition to Iraq as the invader of Kuwait. In so doing, he
assumed that his behavior would ensure continued Palestinian
support in Jordan and the occupied territories without
alienating the Arab Gulf countries. The rapid unfolding of
events proved the second half of his assumption deadly wrong.
Arafat ended up a leader with a diminished constituency, since
his sizable base in Kuwait literally vanished. At the same
time, he lost his Arab allies in the Gulf.
</p>
<p> Another example of Arafat's miscalculations was his attempt
to mediate between Iraq and the Arab governments aligned
against it. His behavior in this regard may have stemmed both
from a desire to localize the Gulf crisis and solve it within
the Arab "family," and his wish to gain political capital from
his efforts if he was successful. Arafat, however, failed to
see that mediation required that all the parties involved share
a spirit of genuine cooperation.
</p>
<p> Saddam, at least as of August 3, 1990, when a majority of the
Arab League members adopted a resolution condemning Iraq's
invasion the day before and calling for an unconditional
withdrawal, adamantly refused to pull his